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Central Intelligence Bulletin

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

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
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to exert pressure on Washington and Bangkok. (Page 3)

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LAOS: The Lao Communists apparently intend to use some allied prisoners as bargaining chips to exert pressure on Washington and Bangkok.

[redacted] the Communists will continue to hold captive beyond the prisoner exchange deadline of June 4 [redacted] US and Thai prisoners, particularly those captured after the February 1973 cease-fire agreement. US civilian contract pilot Emmet Kay is the only American prisoner to fall within the post-agreement category and the only one the Pathet Lao have admitted holding.

The [redacted] does not indicate that additional [redacted] prisoners are presently being detained. Another four Americans, however, are believed to have been captured in Laos prior to the agreement, and 314 are listed as missing in action.

[redacted] the Communists plan to link the release of these prisoners to the cessation of US aerial reconnaissance flights over Lao territory, to the disbanding of [redacted] intelligence organizations in the twin capitals of Vientiane and Luang Prabang, and to the dissolution of [redacted] bases.

[redacted] apprehension on the part of the Pathet Lao that the US and Thailand do not intend to comply fully with the provisions of the 1973 Lao Accords. These fears probably stem from the Communists' recognition of their own violation of the accords.

[redacted] Heavy stress is placed on the cessation of overflights along the eastern trail

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network [redacted]

[redacted] Moreover, [redacted]

[redacted] personnel captured after the cease-fire agreement constitute proof of continued US and Thai "aggression" against Laos and that this argument might be used to counter anticipated allied demands for the withdrawal of all North Vietnamese troops. [redacted]

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